SHIVANAND GAURISHANKAR BASWANTI Vs. LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS & ORS.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4324 OF 2008

ARISING OUT OF

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 12629/2007

SHIVANAND GAURISHANKAR BASWANTI … APPELLANT

VERSUS

LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE

MILLS & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

C.K. THAKKER, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is directed against

summary dismissal of writ petition No. 5664 of

2006 on February 12, 2007 by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay observing that it was not

a fit case to entertain the petition in

exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. The case has a chequered history and

with a view to appreciate the contentions

raised by the parties, the background is

required to be kept in view. Laxmi Vishnu

Textile Mills (`Company’ for short)–respondent

No.1 herein was formerly known as Vishnu Cotton

Mills Ltd. It was registered on May 19, 1908

under the Indian Companies Act, 1873 (then in

force). It was operating through two cotton

textile mills, namely, (i) Laxmi Mill, and (ii)

Vishnu Mill. Somewhere in the year 1961, Laxmi

Mill was merged in Vishnu Mill and was given

the present name i.e. Laxmi Vishnu Textile

Mills Ltd. There were large number of workers

in the mill and there was considerable profit

in the business. By the passage of time,

however, the Company started incurring losses

and things turned worse in later eighties.

Proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies

(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter

referred to `SICA’) had been initiated. On

April 28, 1994, the Board of Industrial and

Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi (`BIFR’ for

short) issued an order declaring the Company as

`sick unit’ and in exercise of powers conferred

on it under Section 22A of the Act, it

restrained the promoters/management from

disposing or transferring its assets described

in the order without prior permission of the

Board. It was also stated that violation of the

order passed by the Board would be dealt with

under Section 33 of SICA.

4. It is also the case of the appellant

that without issuing notice and without

obtaining permission from the Appropriate

Authority as required under Sections 25-O and

25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the

management of the Company resorted to illegal

closure and lockout of the Company. Thus, from

February 28, 1995, the Company is illegally

closed.

5. According to the appellant, BIFR

considered the facts and circumstances of the

case in their entirety and on December 30, 1996

passed an order recording its satisfaction as

required by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of

the Act that it was not possible for the

Company to revive and it was just and equitable

that Company should be wound up. The opinion

was forwarded to the High Court of Judicature

at Bombay with a request that banks and

financial institutions may explore the

possibility of sale of the assets of the

Company. It was proposed to entrust the work of

sale of assets to State Bank of India (SBI),

the lead bank in the case. The Operative Agency

(OA), namely, IDBI was directed to hold a joint

meeting of all participating banks and

financial institutions and to furnish a

detailed report on sale of assets of the

Company through SBI latest by February 28,

1997.

6. It may be stated at this stage that

SBI was one of the major creditors. It

initiated recovery proceedings against the

Company by filing Original Application No. 2638

of 1999 and got a decree from Debt Recovery

Tribunal (DRT)-1, Mumbai for a sum of Rs.84.39

crores with interest. Other financial

institutions had also initiated proceedings for

recovery of their dues. Receiver was appointed

by DRT-1, Mumbai, who took possession of the

properties of the Company. Steps were also

taken to protect properties by employing police

force. The Receiver also met representatives of

Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, recognized Union–

respondent No.8 herein. The Receiver was in

possession of the property except those

properties which were occupied by the employees

who were in service of the Company and were

residing in the quarters provided to them while

they were in employment. Possession of the

machinery and other movable properties of the

Company was also taken over. Since the dues of

workers were neither settled nor paid, several

workers approached Controlling Authority under

the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 for gratuity.

Orders were passed in their favour directing

the Company to pay full amount of gratuity with

interest thereon. The said amount was also not

paid. Meanwhile, Trans Asia Global Company–

respondent No.7 expressed its desire to

purchase the property. According to the

appellant, respondent No.8–Union had no

authority to represent the interests of workers

of respondent No.1–Company and yet on March 8,

2005, it purportedly entered into a tripartite

agreement with respondent No.1–Company,

respondent No.8–Union and respondent No.7-M/s

Trans Asia Global Company. Respondent No.1-

Company under the tripartite agreement sold the

property to respondent No.7 for Rs.46.65

crores. The claim of the workmen was settled at

Rs.22.21 crores whereas in fact, the claim of

the workmen was more than Rs.132 crores. The

purported agreement never brought to the notice

of the workmen and they were kept in complete

dark. The property of the Company was worth

Rs.250 crores which could have satisfied claims

of SBI, legitimate dues of the workmen as also

of financial institutions and other creditors.

According to the appellant, the other agreement

was also entered into between secured and

unsecured creditors, labour representatives,

the Company and the purchaser on April 20,

2005. The agreement states that all secured

creditors, unsecured creditors and

representatives of the workmen had a meeting

and they all agreed on One Time Settlement

(OTS) and accepted the scheme of selling the

entire property by a private treaty to

respondent No.7 and accordingly the property

was sold. The action, however, was totally

illegal, uncalled for and in contravention of

various provisions of law.

PIL WRIT PETITION

7. According to the appellant, as soon as

he came to know about the above agreements,

sale of property by private negotiations and

without taking workers in confidence, he

submitted a representation to the Chief Justice

of High Court of Bombay pointing out several

illegalities committed by respondent No.1–

Company in not settling the dues of workmen.

The representation was converted into Public

Interest Litigation (PIL) and was registered as

PIL Writ Petition No. 126 of 2005. The

appellant herein filed an affidavit in the said

petition on June 27, 2006. The writ petition

came up for hearing before a Division Bench of

the High Court on July 13, 2006 and after

hearing learned counsel for the parties, the

writ petition was disposed of by the Court

observing that the grievance of the workers

could be redressed before `appropriate forum’.

The complaint against sale of property by

private treaty also could be adjudicated in

`proper proceedings’ and the controversy did

not deserve to be taken into PIL. Liberty,

however, was granted by the Court to all

aggrieved parties to pursue `appropriate

remedy’ for redressal of their grievances.

PRESENT WRIT PETITION

8. The appellant, thereafter, filed

present Writ Petition No. 5664 of 2006 in the

High Court of Bombay under Article 226 of the

Constitution and prayed for a writ of

certiorari or any other appropriate writ,

direction or order quashing all the actions in

the matter of recovery proceedings before the

Recovery Officer, Mumbai Debt Recovery Tribunal

No.1 and by examining the validity, propriety

and correctness of such proceedings and to

quash and set aside order of sale of properties

–movable and immovable–of respondent No.1–

Company in favour of respondent No.7. A writ of

mandamus was sought directing DRT-1, Mumbai not

to disburse any amount to anyone till the

claims of the workers have been properly

adjudicated and the amount paid. A prayer was

made to continue to employ all workers till

their services are legally terminated or till

lawful closure is effected. Interim relief was

also prayed.

ORDER OF HIGH COURT

9. The High Court, as observed above,

dismissed the writ petition observing that it

was not a fit case to interfere with by an

order dated February 12, 2007 in exercise of

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution. The said order is challenged

by the appellant in this appeal.

10. Notice was issued by this Court on

September 7, 2007 and meanwhile order passed by

DRT was stayed. Affidavits and further

affidavits were thereafter filed by the

parties. The Registry was directed to place the

matter for final disposal and that is how the

matter is before us.

11. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS

12. Learned counsel for the appellant

contended that all orders passed and actions

taken by the Authorities are unlawful, illegal

and contrary to law. It was submitted that the

first respondent-Company had resorted to

illegal closure and unlawful lockout due to

which workers had suffered a lot. It was also

submitted that when proceedings had been

initiated under SICA and an order was passed by

BIFR restraining the management of the 1st

respondent-Company from transferring,

alienating or disposing its property, no action

could have been taken for sale of the property.

Apart from the fact that such action is illegal

and in violation of the order passed by BIFR,

it is also contrary to law and is punishable

under Section 33 of SICA. A grievance was also

made that though there were several secured and

unsecured creditors and more than 4,000

workers, whose dues had not been paid, they

were never taken in confidence and private

settlement had been arrived at. Such action

could not be said to be legal or in consonance

with law. Moreover, the property of the 1st

respondent-Company which is worth more than

Rs.250 crores had been sold away by a `throw

away’ price of less than Rs.50 crores. It has

prejudicially affected the interest of families

of thousands of workers who would have

otherwise got their legitimate dues but for the

illegal settlement by `interested’ persons.

According to the appellant, most of the workers

were not in favour of so called settlement of

acceptance of an amount of Rs.22.21 crores

towards full and final settlement of their dues

when they were actually entitled to six times

more the said amount. Respondent No.7 could not

have represented all the workers and entered

into such settlement by accepting less than 20%

of their dues. According to the appellant, most

of the workers have objection against such

settlement and they have supported the

appellant and several employees had expressed

their opinion in writing to that effect. The

appellant had stated that when he came to know

about the decree passed by DRT and execution

proceedings in pursuance of the said decree and

sale of property, he drew the attention of the

Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court of Bombay

by making a representation which was treated as

PIL Writ Petition. The High Court ought to have

granted relief in that proceeding. The High

Court, however, disposed of the writ-petition

by granting liberty to the parties to take

appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.

The appellant, therefore, filed fresh petition

but the High Court by a `cryptic’ order,

dismissed the same without entering into the

merits of the matter. It was, therefore,

submitted by the appellant that the impugned

order passed by the High Court deserves to be

set aside quashing and setting aside the order

of sale in favour of respondent No.7 and by

directing the authorities to decide the matter

afresh in accordance with law.

RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS

13. The contesting respondents, on the

other hand, strongly urged that the appeal

deserves to be dismissed and no interference by

this Court is called for. The appellant has no

locus standi to file a petition either in the

High Court or to prefer an appeal in this

Court. It was contended that respondent No.1–

Company was in continuous loss since several

years and in the year 1995, it was closed down.

Crores of rupees were required to be paid to

State Bank of India, other financial

institutions as also to workers. Proceedings

had been initiated under SICA and BIFR was

satisfied that the Company could not be revived

and it favoured winding up of the Compny. A

decree was passed in favour of SBI by DRT-1,

Mumbai for substantial amount of more than

Rs.80 crores with interest. Over and above the

said amount, there were other secured and

unsecured creditors. Moreover, outstanding dues

of workers were also there. Movable and

immovable property of the Company was not

enough to clear up all the dues. It was,

therefore, felt that a fair settlement could be

arrived at so that all the parties could get an

equitable share and proper and reasonable

amount from the property owned and possessed by

respondent No.1-Company. It is in the light of

the above facts that the parties i.e., (i)

Company; (ii) Secured and unsecured creditors;

and (iii) Union sat together, discussed the

problem and settled the matter. SBI which was

having a decree for Rs.84 crores with interest

thereon, agreed to let go substantial part of

the amount so that workers may not be

prejudicially affected. Other creditors also

adopted positive and constructive attitude. The

Union considered the fate of families of

several workers and in the capacity of

`Representative Union’ under the Bombay

Industrial Relations Act, 1946 exercised the

power and agreed to the settlement. In fact, it

was the case of respondent No.7-Union that

during the intervening period of about one

decade after the closure of the Mills in 1995,

about 400 workers died. If settlement would not

have been arrived at, it would have resulted

into further agony to the remaining workers and

their families as also the families of those

workers who lost their lives during the

pendency of proceedings. It was in these

circumstances that the best solution had been

thought by way of settlement and no fault can

be found against Representative Union in

agreeing to such settlement.

14. It was also submitted that under the

Act of 1946, it is the Representative Union

which alone has exclusive right in any industry

to represent the entire class of workmen in the

local area. The appellant had no locus or

standing to agitate grievance or raise dispute

on behalf of workers/labourers. But, even

otherwise, a representation which was treated

as PIL Writ Petition was dismissed by the High

Court and that order had never been challenged

by the appellant by approaching this Court and

the decision had become final. It was contended

that from the order of the Court it was very

clear that liberty was granted to aggrieved

parties to take appropriate remedy, in

appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings.

The appellant, however, neither approached

Labour Forum nor went to Debt Recovery

Appellate Tribunal but filed a fresh writ-

petition. Obviously, the subsequent petition in

which the impugned order is passed was not PIL

as it was registered as Writ Petition

instituted by an individual. The High Court

was, therefore, wholly right and fully

justified in dismissing the said petition in

limine, particularly in the light of the order

passed in previous PIL Writ Petition.

15. It was submitted that the situation

today is irreversible inasmuch as after the

settlement had been arrived at between the

parties, the purchaser-respondent No.7 had

deposited the entire purchase price with DRT.

The secured creditors as well as labourers were

paid their dues as per the said settlement and

their respective shares. Creditors had issued

`discharge certificates’. The Assistant Labour

Commissioner had disbursed the amount to the

workers and their family members who are more

than four thousand. The appellant who was also

one of the workers was paid more than

Rs.60,000/- and he issued a receipt in token of

acceptance of the said amount. The order of

sale in favour of respondent No.7 was confirmed

by DRT and the sale became final. Sale

certificate was also issued in favour of the

purchaser. It had also paid an amount of

Rs.2.25 crores towards stamp duty and got the

property registered in its name. All those

orders were never challenged by the appellant

by taking `appropriate proceedings’. If at this

stage, this Court interferes and sets aside the

orders passed by the authorities from time to

time, irreparable injury and loss would be

caused not only to the purchaser-respondent

No.7, but to other respondents as well. For

instance, it would be very difficult for the

workers who had received the amount to refund

or pay back the said amount which would be the

direct consequence. It would be difficult for

respondent No.7 also if it will not be able to

recover the amount which it has paid. Moreover,

no secured or unsecured creditor has come

forward and has made a complaint to this Court

that though he was entitled to a particular

amount, he had not been paid and he has

grievance against the settlement. The appellant

who is only one person and has received his

dues, has approached the High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution after dismissal

of Public Interest Litigation and it is he who

contends that several creditors have not been

paid their dues and workers have also suffered

and the settlement should be set aside. It was

submitted that the High Court was right in not

entertaining such petition and this Court, in

exercise of power under Article 136 of the

Constitution, may not interfere with the said

order.

CONSIDERATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS

16. Having heard the learned counsel for

the parties and having gone through the records

and proceedings of the case, in our opinion,

this is not a fit case for exercise of

discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution.

17. It is clear that so far as the present

proceedings are concerned, they are not in the

nature of por bono publico. The appellant

herein had made representation to the Hon’ble

Chief Justice of High Court of Judicature at

Bombay earlier which was treated as Writ

Petition (PIL) and the petition was disposed of

by the Court granting liberty to the aggrieved

parties to approach appropriate forum in

appropriate proceeding without granting any

relief. Prima facie, therefore, in our

opinion, the contention of the contesting

respondents is well-founded that if the

appellant herein was aggrieved by certain

orders passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT)-

I, Mumbai, he ought to have approached Debt

Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) by filing

appeals against those orders. If he had

grievance against the Company or inaction on

the part of the Authorities under Labour Laws

on the ground that they had not protected the

interests of workers of Laxmi Vishnu Textile

Mills, he ought to have approached Labour

Forum. The appellant, however, did neither.

As soon as the PIL Writ Petition was disposed

of, within few days, he filed another writ

petition in his individual capacity. The High

Court, in our opinion, therefore, was right in

dismissing it in limine by passing the impugned

order that it was not a fit case to exercise

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution.

MERITS OF THE MATTER

18. On merits also, we find no substance

in the contention raised by the learned counsel

for the appellant. From the record, it is

clear that from eighties the respondent No. 1-

Company was in financial doldrums. Day-by-day,

the position deteriorated and it had incurred

heavy losses. So much so that the Mill was

required to be closed down somewhere in 1995.

Admittedly, after February, 1995, the Company

has never revived. It is also clear from the

record that substantial amount was due and

payable by the Company to State Bank of India,

several other financial institutions, secured

and unsecured creditors and to workers.

Proceedings had been initiated under SICA. BIFR

had passed orders from time to time and finally

it recommended winding up of the Company on

being satisfied that rehabilitation of the

Company was not possible. A recommendation was,

therefore, made and papers were forwarded to

the High Court concerned, i.e. the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay. It is further clear

that in favour of one major creditors, i.e.

State Bank of India a decree was passed by DRT-

I, Mumbai for Rs.84.39 crores with interest

thereon. It has been brought on record that

several other financial institutions had

approached DRT and either orders were passed in

their favour or proceedings were pending. It

is brought to our notice that many workers had

gone to Controlling Authority under the Payment

of Gratuity Act, 1972 and obtained orders in

their favour directing the first respondent

Company to pay gratuity with interest thereon.

The Company was not in a position to pay entire

dues. In the circumstances, DRT-I, Mumbai

ordered to take appropriate steps so that joint

meeting of all financial institutions and

representatives of workers be held and the

matter could be settled. Meanwhile, respondent

No. 7-Trans Asia Global Trade expressed its

desire to purchase the property. On March 8,

2005, a tripartite agreement had been arrived

at between respondent No. 1-Company,

representatives of respondent No.8-Union of

workers and Trans Asia Global Trade-intending

purchaser. In the agreement it was stated that

the Company had huge liability and there were

several secured creditors. The property owned

by the Company was not enough to meet with all

liabilities. The representatives of respondent

No.8 Union were aware of the said fact and

agreed to accept amount of Rs.22.21 crores

towards full and final settlement of dues of

workers. Respondent No. 7 decided to purchase

the property for Rs.46.65 crores. The

agreement was executed on March 8, 2005 and

signed by all the three parties to the

agreement, i.e. by the Mill-Company, by the

purchaser of property and also by

representatives of respondent No.8 Union. A

joint meeting of secured and unsecured

creditors was also held on April 20, 2005

wherein secured and unsecured creditors of the

first respondent-Company agreed to share sale

proceeds of Rs.46.65 crores by accepting and

finalizing One Time Settlement (OTS). Final

decision was taken on the basis of the

agreement arrived at earlier on March 8, 2005.

It was decided to sell the property to

respondent No.7 for Rs.46.65 crores. The amount

which was to be paid as per the final agreement

came as under;

Institutions/B Principa Rs. (in

anks/ l O/S Crore)

Labour On Proposed

31.3.199 share

SBI 28.05 14.02

IDBI 4.08 2.04

ICICI 1.24 0.61

IFCI 1.28 0.63

IIBI 1.54 0.76

Labour 22.21

Bank of 1.50 0.50

Maharashtra

MSEB 5.37 4.00

Sales Tax 0.99

Solapur 0.89

Municipal

Corporation

and

Octroi

GRAND TOTAL 46.65

19. On October 6, 2005, an order was

passed by Recovery Officer, DRT-I, Mumbai in

which all the above facts had been stated. The

Recovery Officer referred to tripartite

agreement and payment of amount to creditors

and workers. The order also recited that as per

the direction of the High Court, the workers’

claim was to be adjudicated by DRT. The

applicant Bank was, therefore, directed to

issue advertisement and invite workmen as per

the guidelines formulated by DRT. All the

workers were directed to lodge their claims in

appropriate format in the Tribunal and all such

claims were ordered to be placed before the

Presiding Officer for adjudication.

20. Regarding valuation of property, it

was stated;

“Since the valuation was done in the

year 2002, before considering the

proposal, the property was valued

again from the approved valuer from

the panel of DRT. According to the

valuation report, offer of the

purchaser is above the distress

valuation price”.

21. It was mentioned that the Tribunal

accepted the offer of M/s Trans Asia Global

Trade for purchasing movable and immovable

property of the Company in the custody of

Receiver appointed by DRT for an amount of

Rs.47.82 crores. The auction-purchaser had

deposited the amount of Rs.47,81,57,777 towards

sale consideration and other expenses. The

recovery officer directed the purchaser to pay

balance amount. The matter was adjourned for

confirmation of sale. An order was passed to

send report to BIFR after confirmation of sale.

The above order has not been challenged by the

appellant in accordance with the provisions of

1993 Act.

22. On December 6, 2005, again, the matter

was placed before the Recovery Officer, DRT-I,

Mumbai. Reference was made to all proceedings,

settlement arrived at between the parties and

sale of property for Rs.47.82 crores. It was

noted that no objection had been received from

any person under Rule 60, 61 or 62 of the

Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 for

setting aside sale and the sale was required to

be confirmed. Accordingly, the sale was

confirmed. Even this order was not challenged

under the Act.

23. On January 20, 2006, the Recovery

Officer, DRT-I, Mumbai issued a sale

certificate for immovable property for Rs.45

crores in favour of respondent No.7-Purchaser.

Another certificate of sale for movable

properties for Rs.2.82 crores was issued by

DRT. Those orders have remained unchallenged

except in the present proceedings.

24. The learned counsel for the appellant

strenuously urged that on April 28, 1994, BIFR

had issued interim order restraining the first

respondent-Company from alienating,

transferring or disposing the property of the

Company without prior permission of the Board.

It was stated that if any action would be taken

in violation of the said order, it would be

punishable under Section 33 of SICA. In view of

the said order, neither the property could have

been sold without the prior permission of BIFR

nor such sale could have been confirmed. It

was also urged that even under 1993 Act,

Recovery Officer could not have permitted or

confirmed sale and it could have been done only

by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Hence, all

proceedings were non est and are required to be

ignored altogether.

25. The learned counsel for the contesting

respondents, on the other hand, submitted that

the order passed by BIFR was merely an interim

order and in 1996, it directed winding up of

the Company and forwarded its opinion to the

High Court. Moreover, no such point had been

taken by the appellant earlier. As discussed

above, even prior to the present petition which

had been filed by the appellant-herein in the

High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution, he had submitted a representation

to the Chief Justice which was registered as

PIL Writ Petition. No such contention was taken

in that petition. Even in the present

proceedings, what was contended by the

appellant before the High Court was as regards

a transaction under which property was sold by

Chairman of the first respondent-Company Mr.

M.L. Apte through his constituted Attorney

Kantilal Shankarlal Shah. Nothing was stated

as to other properties.

26. But even on merits, the impugned

action calls for no interference. The order

dated April 28, 1994 passed by BIFR reads as

under;

“Whereas a draft scheme for

rehabilitation of M/s Laxmi Vishnu

Textile Mills has been prepared,

circulated and published by the Board

under Section 18 of the Sick

Industrial Companies (Special

Provisions) Act, 1935 in pursuance of

its proceedings held/orders face in

the case on 14.2.1994.

And whereas, the Board is of the

opinion that in the interest of

rehabilitation of the sick industrial

company, creditors, shareholders as

also in public interest, it is

necessary to direct the existing

promoters/management of sick

industrial company; M/s Laxmi Vishnu

Textile Mills not to disposed of,

except with the consent of the Board,

any of its fixed and other assets

charged/hypothecated to the financial

institutions, banks and other

creditors, the board, in exercise of

powers conferred on it by Section 22A

of the Sick Industrial Companies

(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 hereby

directs the existing promoters/

management is invited to the

provisions of Section 33, where under

violation of any of the orders of the

Board is punishable in the manner laid

down therein”.

27. Plain reading of the order makes it

clear that the Board was of the opinion that in

the interest of rehabilitation of the sick

industrial company, its creditors, shareholders

as also in public interest, certain directions

were necessary. The Company was, therefore,

restrained from disposing the property which

was charged /hypothecated to financial

institutions. The submission of the learned

counsel for the contesting respondents is that

there was no question of revival of the Company

in view of order passed by BIFR in 1996 and its

recommendation for winding up of the Company.

Regarding interests of creditors and other

persons, it was stated that in March, 2005,

tripartite agreement had been arrived at

wherein representatives of labour Union, first

respondent-Mill Company and the purchaser were

present and the agreement was signed by all of

them. Likewise, in April, 2005, joint meeting

of secured and unsecured creditors,

representatives of Union and vendor and vendee

was held and all of them agreed for OTS and

expressed their willingness to accept lesser

amount. In the circumstances, charge imposed

and prohibition issued by BIFR on the Company

no more remained operative. On October 6, 2005,

therefore, it was observed by the Recovery

Officer of DRT-I, Mumbai to send information to

BIFR after confirmation of sale. Consequential

action of confirmation of sale was thereafter

taken on December 6, 2005 and sale certificate

was also issued on January 20, 2006. All the

actions were taken only after March/April 2005.

They, therefore, could not be said to be

contrary to law or in violation of the order

passed by BIFR.

28. Even otherwise, on the facts and in

the circumstances of the case, we are fully

satisfied that had the agreements in question

not been arrived at, all parties including

workers for whom great concern had been shown

by the appellant would have suffered. In fact,

in an affidavit filed on behalf of the State

Bank of India, it was stated that in the light

of the decree passed in favour of State Bank of

India by DRT-I, Mumbai, the Bank would be

entitled to Rs.222.34 crores. Similarly, other

institutions were also entitled to substantial

amount. It was because of conjoint and combined

efforts of all the parties that agreements

could be arrived at. It was stated that a

Cabinet Minister used his good offices and One

Time Settlement (OTS) had been arrived with

Banks and financial institutions and workmen

were able to get the amount which had not been

paid to them for many years. The contention

that secured and unsecured creditors and

workers have not received their dues has no

force.

29. Again, who has approached this Court?

Neither a secured nor an unsecured creditor.

Nor a representative of a labour union. Nor

even a person acting pro bono publico. As

already adverted to earlier, PIL Writ Petition

at the instance of the appellant was dismissed

by the High Court and the said decision was

never challenged by him. Here is an employee

who is also one of the workers, who has been

paid his dues. He accepted the amount of

Rs.62,555/- and issued `No Objection

Certificate’ (No Dues Certificate) -no doubt by

putting an endorsement “Accepted under

Protest”. He has urged that the workmen have

not been paid their dues and injustice had been

done to them. To us, even there, the appellant

is not right. A Representative Union has taken

a decision which is binding on all employees.

That aspect, however, we will deal with at a

later stage.

30. The learned counsel strongly relied

upon a decision of this Court in NGEF Ltd. v.

Chandra Developers (P) Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 219.

In that case, this Court held that the

provisions of SICA would prevail over the

provisions of the Companies Act since it is a

special statute and a `complete code’ in

itself. The Court also held that the

jurisdiction of the Company Court in the

matters relating to winding up of a sick

Company would arise only when BIFR or AAIFR

exercises its jurisdiction under Section 20 of

SICA recommending the winding up of the Company

upon arriving at a finding that there does not

exist any chance of revival of the Company.

Referring to Gray’s Inn Construction Co. Ltd.,

Re, (1980) 1 All ER 814 : (1980) 1 WLR 711 and

Pankaj Mehra v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 2

SCC 756, however, the Court observed that

“disposition of assets during the interregnum

may not be irretrievably void but the courts

are required to exercise power with caution and

circumspection”.

STATUS AND POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE UNION

31. The learned counsel for the appellant

contended that respondent No. 8 could not have

agreed to accept a meager amount of Rs.22

crores when the outstanding dues were more than

Rs.130 crores. It was also stated that majority

of workers are with the appellant and they are

opposed to the settlement. Thousands of workers

have so stated in writing and informed the

appellant that the grievance raised by the

appellant is well-founded and they are entitled

to much more amount than what had been paid

under the settlement.

32. Even this contention has no force.

The learned counsel for the Union, in our

opinion, is right in submitting that under the

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, it is

the `Representative Union’ which has all powers

to enter into a settlement on behalf of workers

in the industry and it is only that Union which

can take a decision under 1946 Act. The said

decision would bind not only the members of the

Union, but also to those workers who are not

members of such Union.

33. The learned counsel, in this

connection, invited our attention to various

provisions of 1946 Act. As the Preamble of the

Act declares, the Act has been enacted “to

regulate the relations of employers and

employees, to make provision for settlement of

industrial disputes and to provide for certain

other purposes”. The Act contains elaborate

provisions for registration of Unions and their

powers.

34. Section 2 defines various terms.

Chapter II deals with Authorities constituted

or appointed under the Act. Chapter III

provides for registration of Unions. Chapter IV

relates to Approved Unions. Chapter V titles

“Representatives of Employers and Employees,

and appearance on their behalf”.

35. Section 27 enables the State

Government to recognize any combination of

employers as Association of Employers in an

industry in any local area and to represent an

employer in any proceeding under the Act.

Section 27A correspondingly provides for

appearance on behalf of employees. It is,

however, in negative terms and enacts that save

as provided in certain cases (Sections 32 and

33), “no employee shall be allowed to appear or

act in any proceeding under this Act except

through the representative of employees”. The

section thus puts an embargo on appearance of

any employee except through the representative

of employees.

36. Section 14 empowers Registrar to

`Industry’ in any `Local Area’. It is thus

clear that there can be only one Representative

Union for one Industry in one Local Area.

Section 30 enumerates representatives of

employees and provides for order of preference

in which such representatives are allowed to

appear or act in any `Industry’ in any `Local

Area’. It reads thus;

30. Representative of employees

Subject to the provisions of section

33A, the following shall be entitled

to appear or act] in the order of

preference specified as the

representative of employees in an

industry in any local area-

(i) a Representative Union for such

industry;

(ii) a Qualified or Primary union of

which the majority of employees

directly affected by the change

concerned are members;

(iii) any Qualified or Primary Union in

respect of such industry

authorised in the prescribed

manner in that behalf by the

employees concerned;

(iv) the Labour Officer if authorised

by the employees concerned;

(v) the persons elected by the

employees in accordance with the

provisions of section 28 or where

the proviso to sub-section (1)

thereof applies, the employees

themselves;

(vi) the Labour Officer:

Provided -

Firstly, that the persons entitled to

appear or act under clause (v) may

authorise any Qualified or Primary

Union in respect of such industry to

appear or act instead of them;

Secondly, that where the Labour

Officer is the representative of the

employees, he shall not enter into any

agreement under section 44 or

settlement under section 58 unless the

terms of such agreement or settlement,

as the case may be, are accepted by

them in the prescribed manner;

Thirdly, where in any proceeding the

persons entitled to appear or act

under clause (v) are more than five,

the prescribed number elected from

amongst them in the prescribed manner

shall be entitled to appear or act

instead.

37. It is thus clear that Representative

Union is having priority and `preference’ over

other Unions to appear on behalf of employees

of such industry in the area. Section 42 in

Chapter VIII provides for change and lays down

procedure for such change. It reads;

42. Notice of change

(1) Any employer intending to effect any

change in respect of an industrial

matter specified in Schedule II

shall give notice of such intention

in the prescribed form to the

representative of employees. He

shall send a copy of such notice to

the Chief Conciliator, the

Conciliator for the industry

concerned for the local area, the

Registrar, the Labour Officer and

such other person as may be

prescribed. He shall also affix copy

of such notice at a conspicuous

place on the premises where the

employees affected by the change are

employed for work and at such other

place as may be directed by the

Chief Conciliator in any particulars

case.

(2) Any employee desiring a change in

respect of an industrial matter not

specified in Schedule I or III give

a notice in the prescribed form to

the employer through the

representatives of employees, who

shall forward a copy of the notice

to the Chief Conciliator, the

Conciliator for the industry

concerned for the local area, the

Registrar, the Labour Officer and

such other person as may be

prescribed.

(3) When no settlement is arrived at in

any conciliation proceeding in

regard to any industrial dispute

which has arisen in consequence of a

notice relating to any change given

under sub-section (1) or sub-section

(2), no fresh notice with regard to

the same change or a change similar

in all material particulars shall be

given before the expiry of two

months from the date of the

completion of the proceeding within

the meaning of section 63. If at any

time after the expiry of the said

period of two months, any employer

or employee again desires the same

change or a change similar in all

material particulars, they shall

give fresh notice in the manner

provided in sub-section (1) or (2),

as the case may be.

(4) Any employee or a representative

union] desiring a change in respect

of (i) any order passed by the

employer under standing orders, or

(ii) any industrial matter arising

out of the application or

interpretation of standing orders,

or (iii) an industrial matter

specified in Schedule III, except

item (5) thereof shall make an

application to the Labour Court and

as respects change desired in any

industrial matter specified in item

5 of Schedule III, to the Industrial

Court:

Provided that no such application shall

lie unless the employee or a

representative union has in the

prescribed manner approached the

employer with a request for the change

and no agreement has been arrived at in

respect of the change within the

prescribed period.

38. The aforesaid provisions came up for

consideration before this Court in Girja

Shankar Kashi Ram v. Gujarat Spinning &

Weaving Co. Ltd., (1962) Supp 2 SCR 890. In

that case, `G’ closed its business and sold its

assets to `T’. The old company discharged all

its workmen when it closed the business. The

new company re-started the business and

employed all the workmen of the old company.

At the time of closure of `G’, a dispute was

pending between the company and its workmen

with respect to bonus. A `Representative

Union’ of the Textile Workers in the city of

Ahmedabad filed an application before the

Labour Appellate Tribunal wherein the dispute

was pending and the matter was sub-judice. The

matter was compromised and `G’ consented to pay

agreed bonus. The Representative Union accepted

the amount and gave an undertaking not to claim

compensation in future. Later on, however,

about 400 employees issued a notice and claimed

compensation for closure. The Representative

Union appeared before the Labour Court and

contended that the application was liable to be

dismissed in view of the compromise arrived at

between the Mill Company and Representative

Union. The Labour Court upheld the objection

and dismissed the application. The order was

confirmed by Industrial Court in appeal as well

as by the High Court in a petition under

Article 227. The employees approached this

Court.

39. This Court considered the relevant

provisions of the 1946 Act, the object

underlying conferment of power on

Representative Union and the action taken by it

and held that when a Representative Union

appears in any proceeding under the Act, none

else can be allowed to appear not even the

employee at whose instance proceedings might

have been started under Section 42(4) of the

Act. The Court held that if the Representative

Union appears, the decision taken by that Union

would be final and binding.

40. Explaining the scheme of the Act, the

Court stated;

“It will be seen that s. 27A provides

that no employee shall be allowed to

appear or act in any proceeding under

the Act, except through the

representative of employees, the only

exception to this being the provisions

of Sections 32 and 33. Therefore, this

section completely bans the appearance

of an employee or of any one on his

behalf in any proceeding after it has

once commenced except through the

representative of employees. The only

exceptions to this complete ban are to

be found in Sections 32 and 33; to

which we shall presently refer. But it

is clear that bona fides or mala fides

of the representative of employees can

have nothing to do with the ban placed

by Section 27A on the appearance of

any one else except the representative

of employees as defined in Section 30

and that if anyone else can appear in

any proceeding we must find a

provisions in that behalf in either

Section 32 or Section 33 which are the

only exception to Section 27A. It may

be noticed that there is no exception

in Section 27A in favour of the

employee, who might have made an

application under Section 42(4), to

appear on his own behalf and the ban

which is placed by Section 27A will

apply equally to such an employee. In

order however to soften the rigour of

the provisions of Section 27A, for it

may well be that the representative of

employees may not choose to appear in

many proceedings started by an

employee under s. 42(4), exceptions

are provided in ss. 32 and 33. The

scheme of these three provisions

clearly is that if the Representative

Union appears, no one else can appear

and carry on a proceeding, even if it

be begun on an application under s. 42

(4) but where the Representative Union

does not choose to appear there are

provisions in ss. 32 and 33 which

permit others to appear in proceedings

under the Act.

Section 32 gives power to a

conciliator, a board, a wage board, a

labour court and the industrial court

to permit an individual, whether an

employee or not, to appear in any

proceeding before him or it. This

shows that the complete ban imposed by

s. 27A can be removed if the

authorities under the Act think it

expedient to permit another person to

appear and that person may be an

employee or not. Thus the employee who

has made an application under s. 42(4)

may be permitted to appear before the

authorities under the Act; but this

provision is subject to a proviso

namely that no such individual which

would include an employee who has

himself made an application under s.

42(4), shall be permitted to appear in

any proceeding in which the

Representative Union has appeared as

the representative of employees.

Reading therefore ss. 27A, 30 and 32

together, it is clear that on one else

can appear in any proceeding under the

Act except a representative of

employees; but the authorities are

empowered to permit anyone to appear

whether he be an employee or not, if

they consider it expedient for the

ends of justice (and we have no doubt

that where representative of employees

does not choose to appear the

authorities will generally permit the

employee who has made the application

under s. 42(4) to appear), but this

power is subject to the proviso,

namely, that on one will be allowed to

appear if the Representative Union has

made an appearance. It will be seen

that the proviso puts the

Representative Union in a special

position out of the six classes

mentioned as representatives of

employees in s. 30. Thus s. 32 makes

it clear that where the Representative

Union of the six classes s. 30,

appears no one else can appear,

including the persons who might have

made an application under s. 42(4). If

the other five classes which are

mentioned in s. 30 as representatives

of employees appear, the authorities

have the power to allow the employee

or any other person to appear along

with them.

Then we come to s. 33, which starts

with a non-obstante clause and deals

with the appearance of an employee or

a representative union through any

person. Section 33 thus is a exception

to s. 27A and authorises an employees

who could not appear in any proceeding

under the Act except through the

representative of employees under s.

27A, to appear through any person in

certain proceedings mentioned in s.

33, but this again is subject to

provisos, with the first of which we

are not concerned here. The second

proviso lays down that no employee

shall be entitled to appear through

any person in any proceeding under the

Act in which the Representative Union

has appeared as the representative of

employees. This proviso again gives a

special position to the Representative

Union out of the six classes of

representatives of employees provided

in s. 30 and makes it clear that

though an employee may appear in

certain proceedings specified in s. 33

through any person in spite of s. 27A,

he cannot do so where a Representative

Union has appeared as the

representative of employees. Here

again the position is the same as in

s. 32; if a representative of

employees other than a Representative

Union has appeared in the proceeding

the employee can also appear through

any person in the proceedings

mentioned in s. 33; but he cannot did

so where the representative of

employees which has appeared even in

proceedings under s. 33 is the

Representative Union”.

41. The Court also held that bona fides or

mala fides of the representative Union has

nothing to do with the complete ban imposed by

the Act on the appearance of any one else

except the representative of employees under

Section 30 of the Act.

42. It was argued that if such

interpretation is accepted, there would be

tyranny of the Representative Union. This

Court, however, negatived even that argument

and observed that the so-called tyranny or

motive of Representative Union cannot change

the legal position and it has no relevance if

the intention of the Legislature is clear and

unambiguous.

43. The Court, therefore, concluded;

“The result therefore of taking ss.

27A, 32 and 33 together is that s. 27A

first places a complete ban on the

appearance of an employee in

proceedings under the Act once it has

commenced except through the

representative of employees. But there

are two exceptions to this ban

contained in ss. 32 and 33. Section 32

is concerned with all proceedings

before the authorities and gives power

to the authorities under the Act to

permit an employee himself to appears

even though a representative of

employees may have appeared but his

permission cannot be granted where the

representative Union has appeared as a

representative of employees. Section

33 which is the other exception allows

an employee to appear through any

person in certain proceedings only

even though a representative of

employees might have appeared; but

here again it is subject to this that

no one else, not even the employee who

might have made the application, will

have the right to appear if a

Representative Union has put in

appearance as the representative of

employees. It is quite clear therefore

that the scheme of the Act is that

where a Representative Union appears

in any proceeding under the Act, no

one else can be allowed to appear not

even the employee at whose instance

the proceedings might have begun under

s. 42(4). But where the appearance is

by any representative of employees

other than a Representative Union

authorities under s. 32 can permit the

employee to appear himself in all

proceedings before them and further

the employee is entitled to appear by

any person in certain proceedings

specified in s. 33. But whenever the

Representative Union has made an

appearance, even the employee cannot

appear in any proceeding under the act

and the representation must be

confined only to the representative

Union. The complete ban therefore laid

by s. 27A on representation otherwise

than through a representative of

employees remains complete where the

representative of employees is the

Representative Union that has

appeared; but if the representative of

employees that has appeared is other

than the Representative Union then ss.

32 and 33 provide for exceptions with

which we have already dealt. There can

therefore be no escape from the

conclusion that the Act plainly

intends that where the Representative

Union appears in any proceeding under

the Act even though that proceeding

might have commenced by an employee

under s. 42(4) of the Act, the

Representative Union alone can

represent the employee and the

employee cannot appear or act in such

proceeding”.

44. Again, in Textile Labour Association,

Bhadra, Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Mill Owners

Association, Ahmedabad, (1970) 3 SCC 890, this

Court held that once Representative Union of

Textile Industry in the local area of Ahmedabad

entered into a compromise, such compromise

would bind all the employees and those

employees who are not members of the

Representative Union cannot contend that they

are against such compromise and are not bound

by it.

45. In Santuram Khudai v. Kimatrai

Printers & Processors Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1978)

1 SCC 162, a similar question arose. The Court

reiterated the law laid down in Girja Shankar

and held that once the Representative Union

appears on behalf of the employees in a

proceeding before a Labour Court under 1946

Act, individual workman has no locus standi.

According to the Court, combined reading of

Sections 27A, 30, 32, 33 and 80 of the Act make

it clear that consistent with the avowed policy

and prevention of exploitation of workmen and

augmentation of their bargaining power, the

Legislature has clothed the Representative

Union with plenary power to appear or act on

behalf of employees in any proceeding under the

Act. Keeping in view the said object, it has

deprived individual employees or workmen of the

right to appear or act in any proceeding under

the Act where the Representative Union enters

appearance or acts as representative of the

employees.

46. Following Girja Shankar, the Court

observed that mala fides or bona fides of the

Representative Union has no relevance in

construing the relevant provisions of the Act.

In case the employees find that the

Representative Union is acting in a manner

which is prejudicial to their interests, their

remedy lies in invoking the aid of the

Registrar under Chapter III of the Act

requesting him to cancel the registration of

the union.

47. Respondent No.8 in its affidavit

asserted that it is a Representative Union

under the Act of 1946, in Textile Industry in

Sholapur Municipal Corporation Area. It was

further stated that once a Representative Union

exists in any industry in a given local area,

it alone has the exclusive right to represent

the entire class of workmen in that industry in

the concerned local area. In the instant case

in the local area of Solapur District,

respondent No. 8 is admittedly the only Union

which has the status of Representative Union in

Textile Industry under the Act. In view of the

above fact, no other Union/Association of

employees or individual employees have right to

represent the workmen of that industry in that

area.

48. In the counter-affidavit, it was

stated by the Representative Union that there

were about 4500 employees in respondent No.1

Mill when it was closed down in February, 1995.

Within a period of about a decade, 400 workmen

had already died. None of them, however,

received any wages or other benefits because of

the pendency of several proceedings in

different courts. The Representative Union

considered their legitimate grievance and

thought it proper to get the matter settled if

reasonable amount could be paid to them,

keeping in view well-known saying “one in hand

is better than two on bush”. They considered

the matter in its entirety, financial condition

of the first respondent-Company, claim of

secured and unsecured creditors, a number of

decrees and orders passed by various

Authorities under different laws and the

properties of the Company. In the larger

interest, the Union decided to accept the

amount of Rs.22.21 crores for workers towards

full and final settlement. By no stretch of

imagination, such action could be held

improper, illegal or mala fide. We are of the

view that the approach adopted and decision

taken by the Representative Union-respondent

No.8 suffers from no infirmity and cannot be

regarded as illegal or otherwise unreasonable.

EQUITABLE JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 136

49. There is one more reason for not

interfering with the order passed by the High

Court and impugned in the present appeal. The

appellant has invoked Article 136 of the

Constitution. The said Article does not confer

a right of appeal on any party. It merely

confers discretionary power on this Court to

grant special leave to appeal in suitable and

appropriate cases. In several cases, this Court

has held that the provision confers right on a

litigant merely to prefer an application

seeking leave to appeal and the discretion is

vested in this Court to grant or refuse such

leave in its wisdom. In view of the language of

Article 136, this Court is not expected to act

as `regular Court of appeal’ settling disputes

by converting into a `Court of Error’. It

interferes only when justice demands

intervention by the highest Court of the

country.

50. It is undoubtedly true that the power

of this Court is plenary, overriding and

extensive and there are no words qualifying,

restricting or limiting that power. The very

conferment of discretionary power defies any

attempt at exhaustive definition of that power.

The power, however, has to be exercised for

doing full and complete justice. But wider the

discretionary power, the more sparing its

exercise. Times out of number this Court has

stressed that though parties promiscuously

provoke this jurisdiction, the Court

parsimoniously invokes the power [vide

Sadhanathan v. Arunachalam, (1980) 3 SCC 141].

51. While exercising power under Article

136 of the Constitution, this Court not only

acts as a Court of law but also as a Court of

equity and hence the power exercised by this

Court under Article 136 must subserve

ultimately the cause of justice. The Court must

decide all issues coming before it on the

considerations of justice, equity and good

conscience. Legal formulations cannot be

divorced from ground realities, fact-situations

before the Court and the effect of laws on the

human beings for whom they are meant.

Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136,

therefore, has to be tampered with equity. This

Court would be failing in its duty if it does

not notice equitable considerations.

52. We are reminded of the following

pertinent and instructive observations of Lord

Watson in La Cite de Montreal v. Les

Eccelesiasticues, (1889) 14 AC 660.

“Cases vary so widely in their

circumstances that the principle upon

which an appeal ought to be allowed do

not admit of anything approaching to

exhaustive definition. No rule can be

laid down which would not necessarily

be subject to future qualification,

and an attempt to formulate any such

rule might therefore prove misleading…

A case may be of a substantial

character, may involve matter of great

public interest, and may raise an

important question of law, yet the

judgment from which leave to appeal is

sought may appear to be plainly right,

or at least to be unattended with

sufficient doubt to justify.”

53. As observed by this Court in Statesman

Ltd. v. Workmen, (1976) 2 SCC 223, the very

width of the power under Article 136 is a

warning against its `freewheeling exercise save

in grave situations’. Circumspection and

circumscription must, therefore, induce the

Court to interfere with the decision under

challenge only if the extraordinary flaws or

grave injustice or other recognized grounds are

made out.

54. We have elaborately dealt with the

facts of the present case. Respondent No.1–

Company was closed down in February, 1995. It

never started functioning thereafter. Financial

liability continued mounting up day by day.

There were several secured and unsecured

creditors and dues of workers. Proceedings

under SICA had been initiated, decrees and

orders were passed against the Company and the

property owned by the Company was not

sufficient to clear up all debts and

liabilities. Keeping in view the entire facts

and circumstances that initially, tripartite

agreement was entered into between respondent

No.1-Company, Representative Union and

intending purchaser on March 8, 2005, a joint

meeting was held between secured and unsecured

creditors, representatives of the Union, the

Company and the purchaser in April, 2005 and in

that meeting, One Time Settlement (OTS) had

been reached. Several actions were taken in

pursuance of the settlement. The amount was

deposited by the purchaser, dues of creditors

were paid, workers and laborers were informed

and they were also paid the amount. The

property was sold by respondent No.1 to

respondent No.7 on October 6, 2005, sale was

confirmed on December 6, 2005, possession of

the property was given to respondent No.7 on

December 14, 2005, sale certificate was issued

on January 20, 2006, respondent No.7 got the

property registered in its name on January 30,

2006 by paying stamp duty of Rs.2.25 crores,

secured creditors gave discharge to respondent

No.1-Company on March 30, 2007. By May 17,

2007, 4054 workers were paid and the said

figure, at the time of hearing of this appeal

reached to 4105. It was also stated by

respondent No.7-purchaser that plant and

machinery were removed and sold as scrap

materials.

55. If, at this stage, we set aside sale

in favour of respondent No.7, serious prejudice

will be caused not only to respondent No.1 and

respondent No.7–vendor and vendee,

respectively, but also to others like banks,

financial institutions, other creditors and

also to workers for whose benefit and welfare

the appellant is fighting. It is pertinent to

note that no secured or unsecured creditor has

come forward making grievance that though he

was entitled to more amount, he has not been

paid such amount. So far as workers are

concerned, we have already dealt with rights of

Representative-Union in detail and have held

that the Representative Union has preferential

right to appear in the proceedings under the

Act. Hence, taking any view of the matter, in

our opinion, this is not a fit case to exercise

discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution.

FINAL ORDER

56. For the forgoing reasons, in our

opinion, the appeal has no substance. It

deserves to be dismissed and is hereby

dismissed. On the facts and in the

circumstances of the case, however, there shall

be no order as to costs.

……………………………J.

(C.K. THAKKER)

NEW DELHI, …………………………….J.

July 11 , 2008. (D.K. JAIN)

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4324 OF 2008 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 12629/2007

SHIVANAND GAURISHANKAR BASWANTI … APPELLANT
VERSUS
LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILEMILLS & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T
C.K. THAKKER, J.
1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is directed against
summary dismissal of writ petition No. 5664 of
2006 on February 12, 2007 by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay observing that it was not
a fit case to entertain the petition in
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. 2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. The case has a chequered history and
with a view to appreciate the contentions
raised by the parties, the background is
required to be kept in view. Laxmi Vishnu
Textile Mills (`Company’ for short)–respondent
No.1 herein was formerly known as Vishnu Cotton
Mills Ltd. It was registered on May 19, 1908
under the Indian Companies Act, 1873 (then in
force). It was operating through two cotton
textile mills, namely, (i) Laxmi Mill, and (ii)
Vishnu Mill. Somewhere in the year 1961, Laxmi
Mill was merged in Vishnu Mill and was given
the present name i.e. Laxmi Vishnu Textile
Mills Ltd. There were large number of workers
in the mill and there was considerable profit
in the business. By the passage of time,
however, the Company started incurring losses
and things turned worse in later eighties.
Proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies 3
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter
referred to `SICA’) had been initiated. On
April 28, 1994, the Board of Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi (`BIFR’ for
short) issued an order declaring the Company as
`sick unit’ and in exercise of powers conferred
on it under Section 22A of the Act, it
restrained the promoters/management from
disposing or transferring its assets described
in the order without prior permission of the
Board. It was also stated that violation of the
order passed by the Board would be dealt with
under Section 33 of SICA.
4. It is also the case of the appellant
that without issuing notice and without
obtaining permission from the Appropriate
Authority as required under Sections 25-O and
25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the
management of the Company resorted to illegal
closure and lockout of the Company. Thus, from
February 28, 1995, the Company is illegally
closed. 4
5. According to the appellant, BIFR
considered the facts and circumstances of the
case in their entirety and on December 30, 1996
passed an order recording its satisfaction as
required by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of
the Act that it was not possible for the
Company to revive and it was just and equitable
that Company should be wound up. The opinion
was forwarded to the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay with a request that banks and
financial institutions may explore the
possibility of sale of the assets of the
Company. It was proposed to entrust the work of
sale of assets to State Bank of India (SBI),
the lead bank in the case. The Operative Agency
(OA), namely, IDBI was directed to hold a joint
meeting of all participating banks and
financial institutions and to furnish a
detailed report on sale of assets of the
Company through SBI latest by February 28,
1997. 5
6. It may be stated at this stage that
SBI was one of the major creditors. It
initiated recovery proceedings against the
Company by filing Original Application No. 2638
of 1999 and got a decree from Debt Recovery
Tribunal (DRT)-1, Mumbai for a sum of Rs.84.39
crores with interest. Other financial
institutions had also initiated proceedings for
recovery of their dues. Receiver was appointed
by DRT-1, Mumbai, who took possession of the
properties of the Company. Steps were also
taken to protect properties by employing police
force. The Receiver also met representatives of
Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, recognized Union–
respondent No.8 herein. The Receiver was in
possession of the property except those
properties which were occupied by the employees
who were in service of the Company and were
residing in the quarters provided to them while
they were in employment. Possession of the
machinery and other movable properties of the
Company was also taken over. Since the dues of 6
workers were neither settled nor paid, several
workers approached Controlling Authority under
the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 for gratuity.
Orders were passed in their favour directing
the Company to pay full amount of gratuity with
interest thereon. The said amount was also not
paid. Meanwhile, Trans Asia Global Company–
respondent No.7 expressed its desire to
purchase the property. According to the
appellant, respondent No.8–Union had no
authority to represent the interests of workers
of respondent No.1–Company and yet on March 8,
2005, it purportedly entered into a tripartite
agreement with respondent No.1–Company,
respondent No.8–Union and respondent No.7-M/s
Trans Asia Global Company. Respondent No.1-
Company under the tripartite agreement sold the
property to respondent No.7 for Rs.46.65
crores. The claim of the workmen was settled at
Rs.22.21 crores whereas in fact, the claim of
the workmen was more than Rs.132 crores. The
purported agreement never brought to the notice 7
of the workmen and they were kept in complete
dark. The property of the Company was worth
Rs.250 crores which could have satisfied claims
of SBI, legitimate dues of the workmen as also
of financial institutions and other creditors.
According to the appellant, the other agreement
was also entered into between secured and
unsecured creditors, labour representatives,
the Company and the purchaser on April 20,
2005. The agreement states that all secured
creditors, unsecured creditors and
representatives of the workmen had a meeting
and they all agreed on One Time Settlement
(OTS) and accepted the scheme of selling the
entire property by a private treaty to
respondent No.7 and accordingly the property
was sold. The action, however, was totally
illegal, uncalled for and in contravention of
various provisions of law.
PIL WRIT PETITION 8
7. According to the appellant, as soon as
he came to know about the above agreements,
sale of property by private negotiations and
without taking workers in confidence, he
submitted a representation to the Chief Justice
of High Court of Bombay pointing out several
illegalities committed by respondent No.1–
Company in not settling the dues of workmen.
The representation was converted into Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) and was registered as
PIL Writ Petition No. 126 of 2005. The
appellant herein filed an affidavit in the said
petition on June 27, 2006. The writ petition
came up for hearing before a Division Bench of
the High Court on July 13, 2006 and after
hearing learned counsel for the parties, the
writ petition was disposed of by the Court
observing that the grievance of the workers
could be redressed before `appropriate forum’.
The complaint against sale of property by
private treaty also could be adjudicated in
`proper proceedings’ and the controversy did 9
not deserve to be taken into PIL. Liberty,
however, was granted by the Court to all
aggrieved parties to pursue `appropriate
remedy’ for redressal of their grievances.
PRESENT WRIT PETITION
8. The appellant, thereafter, filed
present Writ Petition No. 5664 of 2006 in the
High Court of Bombay under Article 226 of the
Constitution and prayed for a writ of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
direction or order quashing all the actions in
the matter of recovery proceedings before the
Recovery Officer, Mumbai Debt Recovery Tribunal
No.1 and by examining the validity, propriety
and correctness of such proceedings and to
quash and set aside order of sale of properties
–movable and immovable–of respondent No.1–
Company in favour of respondent No.7. A writ of
mandamus was sought directing DRT-1, Mumbai not
to disburse any amount to anyone till the
claims of the workers have been properly 1
adjudicated and the amount paid. A prayer was
made to continue to employ all workers till
their services are legally terminated or till
lawful closure is effected. Interim relief was
also prayed.
ORDER OF HIGH COURT
9. The High Court, as observed above,
dismissed the writ petition observing that it
was not a fit case to interfere with by an
order dated February 12, 2007 in exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution. The said order is challenged
by the appellant in this appeal.
10. Notice was issued by this Court on
September 7, 2007 and meanwhile order passed by
DRT was stayed. Affidavits and further
affidavits were thereafter filed by the
parties. The Registry was directed to place the
matter for final disposal and that is how the
matter is before us.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the
parties. 1
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
12. Learned counsel for the appellant
contended that all orders passed and actions
taken by the Authorities are unlawful, illegal
and contrary to law. It was submitted that the
first respondent-Company had resorted to
illegal closure and unlawful lockout due to
which workers had suffered a lot. It was also
submitted that when proceedings had been
initiated under SICA and an order was passed by
BIFR restraining the management of the 1st
respondent-Company from transferring,
alienating or disposing its property, no action
could have been taken for sale of the property.
Apart from the fact that such action is illegal
and in violation of the order passed by BIFR,
it is also contrary to law and is punishable
under Section 33 of SICA. A grievance was also
made that though there were several secured and
unsecured creditors and more than 4,000
workers, whose dues had not been paid, they
were never taken in confidence and private 1
settlement had been arrived at. Such action
could not be said to be legal or in consonance
with law. Moreover, the property of the 1st
respondent-Company which is worth more than
Rs.250 crores had been sold away by a `throw
away’ price of less than Rs.50 crores. It has
prejudicially affected the interest of families
of thousands of workers who would have
otherwise got their legitimate dues but for the
illegal settlement by `interested’ persons.
According to the appellant, most of the workers
were not in favour of so called settlement of
acceptance of an amount of Rs.22.21 crores
towards full and final settlement of their dues
when they were actually entitled to six times
more the said amount. Respondent No.7 could not
have represented all the workers and entered
into such settlement by accepting less than 20%
of their dues. According to the appellant, most
of the workers have objection against such
settlement and they have supported the
appellant and several employees had expressed 1
their opinion in writing to that effect. The
appellant had stated that when he came to know
about the decree passed by DRT and execution
proceedings in pursuance of the said decree and
sale of property, he drew the attention of the
Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court of Bombay
by making a representation which was treated as
PIL Writ Petition. The High Court ought to have
granted relief in that proceeding. The High
Court, however, disposed of the writ-petition
by granting liberty to the parties to take
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
The appellant, therefore, filed fresh petition
but the High Court by a `cryptic’ order,
dismissed the same without entering into the
merits of the matter. It was, therefore,
submitted by the appellant that the impugned
order passed by the High Court deserves to be
set aside quashing and setting aside the order
of sale in favour of respondent No.7 and by
directing the authorities to decide the matter
afresh in accordance with law. 1

RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS
13. The contesting respondents, on the
other hand, strongly urged that the appeal
deserves to be dismissed and no interference by
this Court is called for. The appellant has no
locus standi to file a petition either in the
High Court or to prefer an appeal in this
Court. It was contended that respondent No.1–
Company was in continuous loss since several
years and in the year 1995, it was closed down.
Crores of rupees were required to be paid to
State Bank of India, other financial
institutions as also to workers. Proceedings
had been initiated under SICA and BIFR was
satisfied that the Company could not be revived
and it favoured winding up of the Compny. A
decree was passed in favour of SBI by DRT-1,
Mumbai for substantial amount of more than
Rs.80 crores with interest. Over and above the
said amount, there were other secured and
unsecured creditors. Moreover, outstanding dues 1
of workers were also there. Movable and
immovable property of the Company was not
enough to clear up all the dues. It was,
therefore, felt that a fair settlement could be
arrived at so that all the parties could get an
equitable share and proper and reasonable
amount from the property owned and possessed by
respondent No.1-Company. It is in the light of
the above facts that the parties i.e., (i)
Company; (ii) Secured and unsecured creditors;
and (iii) Union sat together, discussed the
problem and settled the matter. SBI which was
having a decree for Rs.84 crores with interest
thereon, agreed to let go substantial part of
the amount so that workers may not be
prejudicially affected. Other creditors also
adopted positive and constructive attitude. The
Union considered the fate of families of
several workers and in the capacity of
`Representative Union’ under the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, 1946 exercised the
power and agreed to the settlement. In fact, it 1
was the case of respondent No.7-Union that
during the intervening period of about one
decade after the closure of the Mills in 1995,
about 400 workers died. If settlement would not
have been arrived at, it would have resulted
into further agony to the remaining workers and
their families as also the families of those
workers who lost their lives during the
pendency of proceedings. It was in these
circumstances that the best solution had been
thought by way of settlement and no fault can
be found against Representative Union in
agreeing to such settlement.
14. It was also submitted that under the
Act of 1946, it is the Representative Union
which alone has exclusive right in any industry
to represent the entire class of workmen in the
local area. The appellant had no locus or
standing to agitate grievance or raise dispute
on behalf of workers/labourers. But, even
otherwise, a representation which was treated
as PIL Writ Petition was dismissed by the High 1
Court and that order had never been challenged
by the appellant by approaching this Court and
the decision had become final. It was contended
that from the order of the Court it was very
clear that liberty was granted to aggrieved
parties to take appropriate remedy, in
appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings.
The appellant, however, neither approached
Labour Forum nor went to Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal but filed a fresh writ-
petition. Obviously, the subsequent petition in
which the impugned order is passed was not PIL
as it was registered as Writ Petition
instituted by an individual. The High Court
was, therefore, wholly right and fully
justified in dismissing the said petition in
limine, particularly in the light of the order
passed in previous PIL Writ Petition.
15. It was submitted that the situation
today is irreversible inasmuch as after the
settlement had been arrived at between the
parties, the purchaser-respondent No.7 had 1
deposited the entire purchase price with DRT.
The secured creditors as well as labourers were
paid their dues as per the said settlement and
their respective shares. Creditors had issued
`discharge certificates’. The Assistant Labour
Commissioner had disbursed the amount to the
workers and their family members who are more
than four thousand. The appellant who was also
one of the workers was paid more than
Rs.60,000/- and he issued a receipt in token of
acceptance of the said amount. The order of
sale in favour of respondent No.7 was confirmed
by DRT and the sale became final. Sale
certificate was also issued in favour of the
purchaser. It had also paid an amount of
Rs.2.25 crores towards stamp duty and got the
property registered in its name. All those
orders were never challenged by the appellant
by taking `appropriate proceedings’. If at this
stage, this Court interferes and sets aside the
orders passed by the authorities from time to
time, irreparable injury and loss would be 1
caused not only to the purchaser-respondent
No.7, but to other respondents as well. For
instance, it would be very difficult for the
workers who had received the amount to refund
or pay back the said amount which would be the
direct consequence. It would be difficult for
respondent No.7 also if it will not be able to
recover the amount which it has paid. Moreover,
no secured or unsecured creditor has come
forward and has made a complaint to this Court
that though he was entitled to a particular
amount, he had not been paid and he has
grievance against the settlement. The appellant
who is only one person and has received his
dues, has approached the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution after dismissal
of Public Interest Litigation and it is he who
contends that several creditors have not been
paid their dues and workers have also suffered
and the settlement should be set aside. It was
submitted that the High Court was right in not
entertaining such petition and this Court, in 2
exercise of power under Article 136 of the
Constitution, may not interfere with the said
order.
CONSIDERATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS
16. Having heard the learned counsel for
the parties and having gone through the records
and proceedings of the case, in our opinion,
this is not a fit case for exercise of
discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution.
17. It is clear that so far as the present
proceedings are concerned, they are not in the
nature of por bono publico. The appellant
herein had made representation to the Hon’ble
Chief Justice of High Court of Judicature at
Bombay earlier which was treated as Writ
Petition (PIL) and the petition was disposed of
by the Court granting liberty to the aggrieved
parties to approach appropriate forum in
appropriate proceeding without granting any
relief. Prima facie, therefore, in our 2
opinion, the contention of the contesting
respondents is well-founded that if the
appellant herein was aggrieved by certain
orders passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT)-
I, Mumbai, he ought to have approached Debt
Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) by filing
appeals against those orders. If he had
grievance against the Company or inaction on
the part of the Authorities under Labour Laws
on the ground that they had not protected the
interests of workers of Laxmi Vishnu Textile
Mills, he ought to have approached Labour
Forum. The appellant, however, did neither.
As soon as the PIL Writ Petition was disposed
of, within few days, he filed another writ
petition in his individual capacity. The High
Court, in our opinion, therefore, was right in
dismissing it in limine by passing the impugned
order that it was not a fit case to exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution.
MERITS OF THE MATTER 2
18. On merits also, we find no substance
in the contention raised by the learned counsel
for the appellant. From the record, it is
clear that from eighties the respondent No. 1-
Company was in financial doldrums. Day-by-day,
the position deteriorated and it had incurred
heavy losses. So much so that the Mill was
required to be closed down somewhere in 1995.
Admittedly, after February, 1995, the Company
has never revived. It is also clear from the
record that substantial amount was due and
payable by the Company to State Bank of India,
several other financial institutions, secured
and unsecured creditors and to workers.
Proceedings had been initiated under SICA. BIFR
had passed orders from time to time and finally
it recommended winding up of the Company on
being satisfied that rehabilitation of the
Company was not possible. A recommendation was,
therefore, made and papers were forwarded to
the High Court concerned, i.e. the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay. It is further clear 2
that in favour of one major creditors, i.e.
State Bank of India a decree was passed by DRT-
I, Mumbai for Rs.84.39 crores with interest
thereon. It has been brought on record that
several other financial institutions had
approached DRT and either orders were passed in
their favour or proceedings were pending. It
is brought to our notice that many workers had
gone to Controlling Authority under the Payment
of Gratuity Act, 1972 and obtained orders in
their favour directing the first respondent
Company to pay gratuity with interest thereon.
The Company was not in a position to pay entire
dues. In the circumstances, DRT-I, Mumbai
ordered to take appropriate steps so that joint
meeting of all financial institutions and
representatives of workers be held and the
matter could be settled. Meanwhile, respondent
No. 7-Trans Asia Global Trade expressed its
desire to purchase the property. On March 8,
2005, a tripartite agreement had been arrived
at between respondent No. 1-Company, 2
representatives of respondent No.8-Union of
workers and Trans Asia Global Trade-intending
purchaser. In the agreement it was stated that
the Company had huge liability and there were
several secured creditors. The property owned
by the Company was not enough to meet with all
liabilities. The representatives of respondent
No.8 Union were aware of the said fact and
agreed to accept amount of Rs.22.21 crores
towards full and final settlement of dues of
workers. Respondent No. 7 decided to purchase
the property for Rs.46.65 crores. The
agreement was executed on March 8, 2005 and
signed by all the three parties to the
agreement, i.e. by the Mill-Company, by the
purchaser of property and also by
representatives of respondent No.8 Union. A
joint meeting of secured and unsecured
creditors was also held on April 20, 2005
wherein secured and unsecured creditors of the
first respondent-Company agreed to share sale
proceeds of Rs.46.65 crores by accepting and 2
finalizing One Time Settlement (OTS). Final
decision was taken on the basis of the
agreement arrived at earlier on March 8, 2005.
It was decided to sell the property to
respondent No.7 for Rs.46.65 crores. The amount
which was to be paid as per the final agreement
came as under;
Institutions/B Principa Rs. (in anks/ l O/S Crore) Labour On Proposed 31.3.199 share 9 SBI 28.05 14.02 IDBI 4.08 2.04 ICICI 1.24 0.61
IFCI 1.28 0.63 IIBI 1.54 0.76 Labour 22.21 Bank of 1.50 0.50 Maharashtra MSEB 5.37 4.00

Sales Tax 0.99 Solapur 0.89 Municipal Corporation and Octroi GRAND TOTAL 46.65

19. On October 6, 2005, an order was
passed by Recovery Officer, DRT-I, Mumbai in 2
which all the above facts had been stated. The
Recovery Officer referred to tripartite
agreement and payment of amount to creditors
and workers. The order also recited that as per
the direction of the High Court, the workers’
claim was to be adjudicated by DRT. The
applicant Bank was, therefore, directed to
issue advertisement and invite workmen as per
the guidelines formulated by DRT. All the
workers were directed to lodge their claims in
appropriate format in the Tribunal and all such
claims were ordered to be placed before the
Presiding Officer for adjudication.
20. Regarding valuation of property, it
was stated;
“Since the valuation was done in the year 2002, before considering the proposal, the property was valued again from the approved valuer from the panel of DRT. According to the valuation report, offer of the purchaser is above the distress valuation price”.

21. It was mentioned that the Tribunal
accepted the offer of M/s Trans Asia Global 2
Trade for purchasing movable and immovable
property of the Company in the custody of
Receiver appointed by DRT for an amount of
Rs.47.82 crores. The auction-purchaser had
deposited the amount of Rs.47,81,57,777 towards
sale consideration and other expenses. The
recovery officer directed the purchaser to pay
balance amount. The matter was adjourned for
confirmation of sale. An order was passed to
send report to BIFR after confirmation of sale.
The above order has not been challenged by the
appellant in accordance with the provisions of
1993 Act.
22. On December 6, 2005, again, the matter
was placed before the Recovery Officer, DRT-I,
Mumbai. Reference was made to all proceedings,
settlement arrived at between the parties and
sale of property for Rs.47.82 crores. It was
noted that no objection had been received from
any person under Rule 60, 61 or 62 of the
Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 for
setting aside sale and the sale was required to 2
be confirmed. Accordingly, the sale was
confirmed. Even this order was not challenged
under the Act.
23. On January 20, 2006, the Recovery
Officer, DRT-I, Mumbai issued a sale
certificate for immovable property for Rs.45
crores in favour of respondent No.7-Purchaser.
Another certificate of sale for movable
properties for Rs.2.82 crores was issued by
DRT. Those orders have remained unchallenged
except in the present proceedings.
24. The learned counsel for the appellant
strenuously urged that on April 28, 1994, BIFR
had issued interim order restraining the first
respondent-Company from alienating,
transferring or disposing the property of the
Company without prior permission of the Board.
It was stated that if any action would be taken
in violation of the said order, it would be
punishable under Section 33 of SICA. In view of
the said order, neither the property could have
been sold without the prior permission of BIFR 2
nor such sale could have been confirmed. It
was also urged that even under 1993 Act,
Recovery Officer could not have permitted or
confirmed sale and it could have been done only
by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Hence, all
proceedings were non est and are required to be
ignored altogether.
25. The learned counsel for the contesting
respondents, on the other hand, submitted that
the order passed by BIFR was merely an interim
order and in 1996, it directed winding up of
the Company and forwarded its opinion to the
High Court. Moreover, no such point had been
taken by the appellant earlier. As discussed
above, even prior to the present petition which
had been filed by the appellant-herein in the
High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution, he had submitted a representation
to the Chief Justice which was registered as
PIL Writ Petition. No such contention was taken
in that petition. Even in the present
proceedings, what was contended by the 3
appellant before the High Court was as regards
a transaction under which property was sold by
Chairman of the first respondent-Company Mr.
M.L. Apte through his constituted Attorney
Kantilal Shankarlal Shah. Nothing was stated
as to other properties.
26. But even on merits, the impugned
action calls for no interference. The order
dated April 28, 1994 passed by BIFR reads as
under;
“Whereas a draft scheme for   rehabilitation of M/s Laxmi Vishnu   Textile Mills has been prepared,   circulated and published by the Board   under Section 18 of the Sick   Industrial Companies (Special   Provisions) Act, 1935 in pursuance of   its proceedings held/orders face in   the case on 14.2.1994.
And whereas, the Board is of the   opinion that in the interest of   rehabilitation of the sick industrial   company, creditors, shareholders as   also in public interest, it is   necessary to direct the existing   promoters/management of sick   industrial company; M/s Laxmi Vishnu   Textile Mills not to disposed of,   except with the consent of the Board,   any of its fixed and other assets   charged/hypothecated to the financial   institutions, banks and other 3
creditors, the board, in exercise of   powers conferred on it by Section 22A   of the Sick Industrial Companies   (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 hereby   directs the existing promoters/   management is invited to the   provisions of Section 33, where under   violation of any of the orders of the   Board is punishable in the manner laid   down therein”.

27. Plain reading of the order makes it
clear that the Board was of the opinion that in
the interest of rehabilitation of the sick
industrial company, its creditors, shareholders
as also in public interest, certain directions
were necessary. The Company was, therefore,
restrained from disposing the property which
was charged /hypothecated to financial
institutions. The submission of the learned
counsel for the contesting respondents is that
there was no question of revival of the Company
in view of order passed by BIFR in 1996 and its
recommendation for winding up of the Company.
Regarding interests of creditors and other
persons, it was stated that in March, 2005,
tripartite agreement had been arrived at 3
wherein representatives of labour Union, first
respondent-Mill Company and the purchaser were
present and the agreement was signed by all of
them. Likewise, in April, 2005, joint meeting
of secured and unsecured creditors,
representatives of Union and vendor and vendee
was held and all of them agreed for OTS and
expressed their willingness to accept lesser
amount. In the circumstances, charge imposed
and prohibition issued by BIFR on the Company
no more remained operative. On October 6, 2005,
therefore, it was observed by the Recovery
Officer of DRT-I, Mumbai to send information to
BIFR after confirmation of sale. Consequential
action of confirmation of sale was thereafter
taken on December 6, 2005 and sale certificate
was also issued on January 20, 2006. All the
actions were taken only after March/April 2005.
They, therefore, could not be said to be
contrary to law or in violation of the order
passed by BIFR. 3
28. Even otherwise, on the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, we are fully
satisfied that had the agreements in question
not been arrived at, all parties including
workers for whom great concern had been shown
by the appellant would have suffered. In fact,
in an affidavit filed on behalf of the State
Bank of India, it was stated that in the light
of the decree passed in favour of State Bank of
India by DRT-I, Mumbai, the Bank would be
entitled to Rs.222.34 crores. Similarly, other
institutions were also entitled to substantial
amount. It was because of conjoint and combined
efforts of all the parties that agreements
could be arrived at. It was stated that a
Cabinet Minister used his good offices and One
Time Settlement (OTS) had been arrived with
Banks and financial institutions and workmen
were able to get the amount which had not been
paid to them for many years. The contention
that secured and unsecured creditors and 3
workers have not received their dues has no
force.
29. Again, who has approached this Court?
Neither a secured nor an unsecured creditor.
Nor a representative of a labour union. Nor
even a person acting pro bono publico. As
already adverted to earlier, PIL Writ Petition
at the instance of the appellant was dismissed
by the High Court and the said decision was
never challenged by him. Here is an employee
who is also one of the workers, who has been
paid his dues. He accepted the amount of
Rs.62,555/- and issued `No Objection
Certificate’ (No Dues Certificate) -no doubt by
putting an endorsement “Accepted under
Protest”. He has urged that the workmen have
not been paid their dues and injustice had been
done to them. To us, even there, the appellant
is not right. A Representative Union has taken
a decision which is binding on all employees.
That aspect, however, we will deal with at a
later stage. 3
30. The learned counsel strongly relied
upon a decision of this Court in NGEF Ltd. v.
Chandra Developers (P) Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 219.
In that case, this Court held that the
provisions of SICA would prevail over the
provisions of the Companies Act since it is a
special statute and a `complete code’ in
itself. The Court also held that the
jurisdiction of the Company Court in the
matters relating to winding up of a sick
Company would arise only when BIFR or AAIFR
exercises its jurisdiction under Section 20 of
SICA recommending the winding up of the Company
upon arriving at a finding that there does not
exist any chance of revival of the Company.
Referring to Gray’s Inn Construction Co. Ltd.,
Re, (1980) 1 All ER 814 : (1980) 1 WLR 711 and
Pankaj Mehra v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 2
SCC 756, however, the Court observed that
“disposition of assets during the interregnum
may not be irretrievably void but the courts 3
are required to exercise power with caution and
circumspection”.
STATUS AND POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE UNION
31. The learned counsel for the appellant
contended that respondent No. 8 could not have
agreed to accept a meager amount of Rs.22
crores when the outstanding dues were more than
Rs.130 crores. It was also stated that majority
of workers are with the appellant and they are
opposed to the settlement. Thousands of workers
have so stated in writing and informed the
appellant that the grievance raised by the
appellant is well-founded and they are entitled
to much more amount than what had been paid
under the settlement.
32. Even this contention has no force.
The learned counsel for the Union, in our
opinion, is right in submitting that under the
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, it is
the `Representative Union’ which has all powers
to enter into a settlement on behalf of workers 3
in the industry and it is only that Union which
can take a decision under 1946 Act. The said
decision would bind not only the members of the
Union, but also to those workers who are not
members of such Union.
33. The learned counsel, in this
connection, invited our attention to various
provisions of 1946 Act. As the Preamble of the
Act declares, the Act has been enacted “to
regulate the relations of employers and
employees, to make provision for settlement of
industrial disputes and to provide for certain
other purposes”. The Act contains elaborate
provisions for registration of Unions and their
powers.
34. Section 2 defines various terms.
Chapter II deals with Authorities constituted
or appointed under the Act. Chapter III
provides for registration of Unions. Chapter IV
relates to Approved Unions. Chapter V titles
“Representatives of Employers and Employees,
and appearance on their behalf”. 3
35. Section 27 enables the State
Government to recognize any combination of
employers as Association of Employers in an
industry in any local area and to represent an
employer in any proceeding under the Act.
Section 27A correspondingly provides for
appearance on behalf of employees. It is,
however, in negative terms and enacts that save
as provided in certain cases (Sections 32 and
33), “no employee shall be allowed to appear or
act in any proceeding under this Act except
through the representative of employees”. The
section thus puts an embargo on appearance of
any employee except through the representative
of employees.
36. Section 14 empowers Registrar to
register a `Representative Union’ for any
`Industry’ in any `Local Area’. It is thus
clear that there can be only one Representative
Union for one Industry in one Local Area.
Section 30 enumerates representatives of
employees and provides for order of preference 3
in which such representatives are allowed to
appear or act in any `Industry’ in any `Local
Area’. It reads thus;
30. Representative of employees   Subject to the provisions of section   33A, the following shall be entitled   to appear or act] in the order of   preference specified as the   representative of employees in an   industry in any local area-
(i) a Representative Union for such   industry;
(ii) a Qualified or Primary union of   which the majority of employees   directly affected by the change   concerned are members;
(iii) any Qualified or Primary Union in   respect of such industry   authorised in the prescribed   manner in that behalf by the   employees concerned;
(iv) the Labour Officer if authorised   by the employees concerned;
(v) the persons elected by the   employees in accordance with the   provisions of section 28 or where   the proviso to sub-section (1)   thereof applies, the employees   themselves; 4
(vi) the Labour Officer:
Provided -
Firstly, that the persons entitled to   appear or act under clause (v) may   authorise any Qualified or Primary   Union in respect of such industry to   appear or act instead of them;
Secondly, that where the Labour   Officer is the representative of the   employees, he shall not enter into any   agreement under section 44 or   settlement under section 58 unless the   terms of such agreement or settlement,   as the case may be, are accepted by   them in the prescribed manner;
Thirdly, where in any proceeding the   persons entitled to appear or act   under clause (v) are more than five,   the prescribed number elected from   amongst them in the prescribed manner   shall be entitled to appear or act   instead.

37. It is thus clear that Representative
Union is having priority and `preference’ over
other Unions to appear on behalf of employees
of such industry in the area. Section 42 in
Chapter VIII provides for change and lays down
procedure for such change. It reads; 4
42. Notice of change(1) Any employer intending to effect any   change in respect of an industrial   matter specified in Schedule II   shall give notice of such intention   in the prescribed form to the   representative of employees. He   shall send a copy of such notice to   the Chief Conciliator, the   Conciliator for the industry   concerned for the local area, the   Registrar, the Labour Officer and   such other person as may be   prescribed. He shall also affix copy   of such notice at a conspicuous   place on the premises where the   employees affected by the change are   employed for work and at such other   place as may be directed by the   Chief Conciliator in any particulars   case.
(2) Any employee desiring a change in   respect of an industrial matter not   specified in Schedule I or III give   a notice in the prescribed form to   the employer through the   representatives of employees, who   shall forward a copy of the notice   to the Chief Conciliator, the   Conciliator for the industry   concerned for the local area, the   Registrar, the Labour Officer and   such other person as may be   prescribed.
(3) When no settlement is arrived at in   any conciliation proceeding in   regard to any industrial dispute   which has arisen in consequence of a   notice relating to any change given 4
under sub-section (1) or sub-section   (2), no fresh notice with regard to   the same change or a change similar   in all material particulars shall be   given before the expiry of two   months from the date of the   completion of the proceeding within   the meaning of section 63. If at any   time after the expiry of the said   period of two months, any employer   or employee again desires the same   change or a change similar in all   material particulars, they shall   give fresh notice in the manner   provided in sub-section (1) or (2),   as the case may be.
(4) Any employee or a representative   union] desiring a change in respect   of (i) any order passed by the   employer under standing orders, or   (ii) any industrial matter arising   out of the application or   interpretation of standing orders,   or (iii) an industrial matter   specified in Schedule III, except   item (5) thereof shall make an   application to the Labour Court and   as respects change desired in any   industrial matter specified in item   5 of Schedule III, to the Industrial   Court:
Provided that no such application shall lie unless the employee or a representative union has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period. 4
38. The aforesaid provisions came up for
consideration before this Court in Girja
Shankar Kashi Ram v. Gujarat Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd., (1962) Supp 2 SCR 890. In
that case, `G’ closed its business and sold its
assets to `T’. The old company discharged all
its workmen when it closed the business. The
new company re-started the business and
employed all the workmen of the old company.
At the time of closure of `G’, a dispute was
pending between the company and its workmen
with respect to bonus. A `Representative
Union’ of the Textile Workers in the city of
Ahmedabad filed an application before the
Labour Appellate Tribunal wherein the dispute
was pending and the matter was sub-judice. The
matter was compromised and `G’ consented to pay
agreed bonus. The Representative Union accepted
the amount and gave an undertaking not to claim
compensation in future. Later on, however,
about 400 employees issued a notice and claimed
compensation for closure. The Representative 4
Union appeared before the Labour Court and
contended that the application was liable to be
dismissed in view of the compromise arrived at
between the Mill Company and Representative
Union. The Labour Court upheld the objection
and dismissed the application. The order was
confirmed by Industrial Court in appeal as well
as by the High Court in a petition under
Article 227. The employees approached this
Court.
39. This Court considered the relevant
provisions of the 1946 Act, the object
underlying conferment of power on
Representative Union and the action taken by it
and held that when a Representative Union
appears in any proceeding under the Act, none
else can be allowed to appear not even the
employee at whose instance proceedings might
have been started under Section 42(4) of the
Act. The Court held that if the Representative
Union appears, the decision taken by that Union
would be final and binding. 4
40. Explaining the scheme of the Act, the
Court stated;

“It will be seen that s. 27A provides that no employee shall be allowed to appear or act in any proceeding under the Act, except through the representative of employees, the only exception to this being the provisions of Sections 32 and 33. Therefore, this section completely bans the appearance of an employee or of any one on his behalf in any proceeding after it has once commenced except through the representative of employees. The only exceptions to this complete ban are to be found in Sections 32 and 33; to which we shall presently refer. But it is clear that bona fides or mala fides of the representative of employees can have nothing to do with the ban placed by Section 27A on the appearance of any one else except the representative of employees as defined in Section 30 and that if anyone else can appear in any proceeding we must find a provisions in that behalf in either Section 32 or Section 33 which are the only exception to Section 27A. It may be noticed that there is no exception in Section 27A in favour of the employee, who might have made an application under Section 42(4), to appear on his own behalf and the ban which is placed by Section 27A will apply equally to such an employee. In order however to soften the rigour of the provisions of Section 27A, for it may well be that the representative of employees may not choose to appear in many proceedings started by an 4
employee under s. 42(4), exceptionsare provided in ss. 32 and 33. Thescheme of these three provisionsclearly is that if the RepresentativeUnion appears, no one else can appearand carry on a proceeding, even if itbe begun on an application under s. 42(4) but where the Representative Uniondoes not choose to appear there areprovisions in ss. 32 and 33 whichpermit others to appear in proceedingsunder the Act.

Section 32 gives power to aconciliator, a board, a wage board, alabour court and the industrial courtto permit an individual, whether anemployee or not, to appear in anyproceeding before him or it. Thisshows that the complete ban imposed bys. 27A can be removed if theauthorities under the Act think itexpedient to permit another person toappear and that person may be anemployee or not. Thus the employee whohas made an application under s. 42(4)may be permitted to appear before theauthorities under the Act; but thisprovision is subject to a provisonamely that no such individual whichwould include an employee who hashimself made an application under s.42(4), shall be permitted to appear inany proceeding in which theRepresentative Union has appeared asthe representative of employees.Reading therefore ss. 27A, 30 and 32together, it is clear that on one elsecan appear in any proceeding under theAct except a representative ofemployees; but the authorities areempowered to permit anyone to appear 4
whether he be an employee or not, ifthey consider it expedient for theends of justice (and we have no doubtthat where representative of employeesdoes not choose to appear theauthorities will generally permit theemployee who has made the applicationunder s. 42(4) to appear), but thispower is subject to the proviso,namely, that on one will be allowed toappear if the Representative Union hasmade an appearance. It will be seenthat the proviso puts theRepresentative Union in a specialposition out of the six classesmentioned as representatives ofemployees in s. 30. Thus s. 32 makesit clear that where the RepresentativeUnion of the six classes s. 30,appears no one else can appear,including the persons who might havemade an application under s. 42(4). Ifthe other five classes which arementioned in s. 30 as representativesof employees appear, the authoritieshave the power to allow the employeeor any other person to appear alongwith them.

Then we come to s. 33, which startswith a non-obstante clause and dealswith the appearance of an employee ora representative union through anyperson. Section 33 thus is a exceptionto s. 27A and authorises an employeeswho could not appear in any proceedingunder the Act except through therepresentative of employees under s.27A, to appear through any person incertain proceedings mentioned in s.33, but this again is subject toprovisos, with the first of which we 4
are not concerned here. The second proviso lays down that no employee shall be entitled to appear through any person in any proceeding under the Act in which the Representative Union has appeared as the representative of employees. This proviso again gives a special position to the Representative Union out of the six classes of representatives of employees provided in s. 30 and makes it clear that though an employee may appear in certain proceedings specified in s. 33 through any person in spite of s. 27A, he cannot do so where a Representative Union has appeared as the representative of employees. Here again the position is the same as in s. 32; if a representative of employees other than a Representative Union has appeared in the proceeding the employee can also appear through any person in the proceedings mentioned in s. 33; but he cannot did so where the representative of employees which has appeared even in proceedings under s. 33 is the Representative Union”.

41. The Court also held that bona fides or
mala fides of the representative Union has
nothing to do with the complete ban imposed by
the Act on the appearance of any one else
except the representative of employees under
Section 30 of the Act. 4
42. It was argued that if such
interpretation is accepted, there would be
tyranny of the Representative Union. This
Court, however, negatived even that argument
and observed that the so-called tyranny or
motive of Representative Union cannot change
the legal position and it has no relevance if
the intention of the Legislature is clear and
unambiguous.
43. The Court, therefore, concluded;
“The result therefore of taking ss. 27A, 32 and 33 together is that s. 27A first places a complete ban on the appearance of an employee in proceedings under the Act once it has commenced except through the representative of employees. But there are two exceptions to this ban contained in ss. 32 and 33. Section 32 is concerned with all proceedings before the authorities and gives power to the authorities under the Act to permit an employee himself to appears even though a representative of employees may have appeared but his permission cannot be granted where the representative Union has appeared as a representative of employees. Section 33 which is the other exception allows an employee to appear through any person in certain proceedings only even though a representative of employees might have appeared; but 5
here again it is subject to this thatno one else, not even the employee whomight have made the application, willhave the right to appear if aRepresentative Union has put inappearance as the representative ofemployees. It is quite clear thereforethat the scheme of the Act is thatwhere a Representative Union appearsin any proceeding under the Act, noone else can be allowed to appear noteven the employee at whose instancethe proceedings might have begun unders. 42(4). But where the appearance isby any representative of employeesother than a Representative Unionauthorities under s. 32 can permit theemployee to appear himself in allproceedings before them and furtherthe employee is entitled to appear byany person in certain proceedingsspecified in s. 33. But whenever theRepresentative Union has made anappearance, even the employee cannotappear in any proceeding under the actand the representation must beconfined only to the representativeUnion. The complete ban therefore laidby s. 27A on representation otherwisethan through a representative ofemployees remains complete where therepresentative of employees is theRepresentative Union that hasappeared; but if the representative ofemployees that has appeared is otherthan the Representative Union then ss.32 and 33 provide for exceptions withwhich we have already dealt. There cantherefore be no escape from theconclusion that the Act plainlyintends that where the RepresentativeUnion appears in any proceeding underthe Act even though that proceeding 5
might have commenced by an employee under s. 42(4) of the Act, the Representative Union alone can represent the employee and the employee cannot appear or act in such proceeding”.

44. Again, in Textile Labour Association,
Bhadra, Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Mill Owners
Association, Ahmedabad, (1970) 3 SCC 890, this
Court held that once Representative Union of
Textile Industry in the local area of Ahmedabad
entered into a compromise, such compromise
would bind all the employees and those
employees who are not members of the
Representative Union cannot contend that they
are against such compromise and are not bound
by it.
45. In Santuram Khudai v. Kimatrai
Printers & Processors Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1978)
1 SCC 162, a similar question arose. The Court
reiterated the law laid down in Girja Shankar
and held that once the Representative Union
appears on behalf of the employees in a
proceeding before a Labour Court under 1946 5
Act, individual workman has no locus standi.
According to the Court, combined reading of
Sections 27A, 30, 32, 33 and 80 of the Act make
it clear that consistent with the avowed policy
and prevention of exploitation of workmen and
augmentation of their bargaining power, the
Legislature has clothed the Representative
Union with plenary power to appear or act on
behalf of employees in any proceeding under the
Act. Keeping in view the said object, it has
deprived individual employees or workmen of the
right to appear or act in any proceeding under
the Act where the Representative Union enters
appearance or acts as representative of the
employees.
46. Following Girja Shankar, the Court
observed that mala fides or bona fides of the
Representative Union has no relevance in
construing the relevant provisions of the Act.
In case the employees find that the
Representative Union is acting in a manner
which is prejudicial to their interests, their 5
remedy lies in invoking the aid of the
Registrar under Chapter III of the Act
requesting him to cancel the registration of
the union.
47. Respondent No.8 in its affidavit
asserted that it is a Representative Union
under the Act of 1946, in Textile Industry in
Sholapur Municipal Corporation Area. It was
further stated that once a Representative Union
exists in any industry in a given local area,
it alone has the exclusive right to represent
the entire class of workmen in that industry in
the concerned local area. In the instant case
in the local area of Solapur District,
respondent No. 8 is admittedly the only Union
which has the status of Representative Union in
Textile Industry under the Act. In view of the
above fact, no other Union/Association of
employees or individual employees have right to
represent the workmen of that industry in that
area. 5
48. In the counter-affidavit, it was
stated by the Representative Union that there
were about 4500 employees in respondent No.1
Mill when it was closed down in February, 1995.
Within a period of about a decade, 400 workmen
had already died. None of them, however,
received any wages or other benefits because of
the pendency of several proceedings in
different courts. The Representative Union
considered their legitimate grievance and
thought it proper to get the matter settled if
reasonable amount could be paid to them,
keeping in view well-known saying “one in hand
is better than two on bush”. They considered
the matter in its entirety, financial condition
of the first respondent-Company, claim of
secured and unsecured creditors, a number of
decrees and orders passed by various
Authorities under different laws and the
properties of the Company. In the larger
interest, the Union decided to accept the
amount of Rs.22.21 crores for workers towards 5
full and final settlement. By no stretch of
imagination, such action could be held
improper, illegal or mala fide. We are of the
view that the approach adopted and decision
taken by the Representative Union-respondent
No.8 suffers from no infirmity and cannot be
regarded as illegal or otherwise unreasonable.
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 136
49. There is one more reason for not
interfering with the order passed by the High
Court and impugned in the present appeal. The
appellant has invoked Article 136 of the
Constitution. The said Article does not confer
a right of appeal on any party. It merely
confers discretionary power on this Court to
grant special leave to appeal in suitable and
appropriate cases. In several cases, this Court
has held that the provision confers right on a
litigant merely to prefer an application
seeking leave to appeal and the discretion is
vested in this Court to grant or refuse such 5
leave in its wisdom. In view of the language of
Article 136, this Court is not expected to act
as `regular Court of appeal’ settling disputes
by converting into a `Court of Error’. It
interferes only when justice demands
intervention by the highest Court of the
country.
50. It is undoubtedly true that the power
of this Court is plenary, overriding and
extensive and there are no words qualifying,
restricting or limiting that power. The very
conferment of discretionary power defies any
attempt at exhaustive definition of that power.
The power, however, has to be exercised for
doing full and complete justice. But wider the
discretionary power, the more sparing its
exercise. Times out of number this Court has
stressed that though parties promiscuously
provoke this jurisdiction, the Court
parsimoniously invokes the power [vide
Sadhanathan v. Arunachalam, (1980) 3 SCC 141]. 5
51. While exercising power under Article
136 of the Constitution, this Court not only
acts as a Court of law but also as a Court of
equity and hence the power exercised by this
Court under Article 136 must subserve
ultimately the cause of justice. The Court must
decide all issues coming before it on the
considerations of justice, equity and good
conscience. Legal formulations cannot be
divorced from ground realities, fact-situations
before the Court and the effect of laws on the
human beings for whom they are meant.
Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136,
therefore, has to be tampered with equity. This
Court would be failing in its duty if it does
not notice equitable considerations.
52. We are reminded of the following
pertinent and instructive observations of Lord
Watson in La Cite de Montreal v. Les
Eccelesiasticues, (1889) 14 AC 660.
“Cases vary so widely in their circumstances that the principle upon which an appeal ought to be allowed do 5
not admit of anything approaching to exhaustive definition. No rule can be laid down which would not necessarily be subject to future qualification, and an attempt to formulate any such rule might therefore prove misleading… A case may be of a substantial character, may involve matter of great public interest, and may raise an important question of law, yet the judgment from which leave to appeal is sought may appear to be plainly right, or at least to be unattended with sufficient doubt to justify.”

53. As observed by this Court in Statesman
Ltd. v. Workmen, (1976) 2 SCC 223, the very
width of the power under Article 136 is a
warning against its `freewheeling exercise save
in grave situations’. Circumspection and
circumscription must, therefore, induce the
Court to interfere with the decision under
challenge only if the extraordinary flaws or
grave injustice or other recognized grounds are
made out.
54. We have elaborately dealt with the
facts of the present case. Respondent No.1–
Company was closed down in February, 1995. It
never started functioning thereafter. Financial 5
liability continued mounting up day by day.
There were several secured and unsecured
creditors and dues of workers. Proceedings
under SICA had been initiated, decrees and
orders were passed against the Company and the
property owned by the Company was not
sufficient to clear up all debts and
liabilities. Keeping in view the entire facts
and circumstances that initially, tripartite
agreement was entered into between respondent
No.1-Company, Representative Union and
intending purchaser on March 8, 2005, a joint
meeting was held between secured and unsecured
creditors, representatives of the Union, the
Company and the purchaser in April, 2005 and in
that meeting, One Time Settlement (OTS) had
been reached. Several actions were taken in
pursuance of the settlement. The amount was
deposited by the purchaser, dues of creditors
were paid, workers and laborers were informed
and they were also paid the amount. The
property was sold by respondent No.1 to 6
respondent No.7 on October 6, 2005, sale was
confirmed on December 6, 2005, possession of
the property was given to respondent No.7 on
December 14, 2005, sale certificate was issued
on January 20, 2006, respondent No.7 got the
property registered in its name on January 30,
2006 by paying stamp duty of Rs.2.25 crores,
secured creditors gave discharge to respondent
No.1-Company on March 30, 2007. By May 17,
2007, 4054 workers were paid and the said
figure, at the time of hearing of this appeal
reached to 4105. It was also stated by
respondent No.7-purchaser that plant and
machinery were removed and sold as scrap
materials.
55. If, at this stage, we set aside sale
in favour of respondent No.7, serious prejudice
will be caused not only to respondent No.1 and
respondent No.7–vendor and vendee,
respectively, but also to others like banks,
financial institutions, other creditors and
also to workers for whose benefit and welfare 6
the appellant is fighting. It is pertinent to
note that no secured or unsecured creditor has
come forward making grievance that though he
was entitled to more amount, he has not been
paid such amount. So far as workers are
concerned, we have already dealt with rights of
Representative-Union in detail and have held
that the Representative Union has preferential
right to appear in the proceedings under the
Act. Hence, taking any view of the matter, in
our opinion, this is not a fit case to exercise
discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution.
FINAL ORDER
56. For the forgoing reasons, in our
opinion, the appeal has no substance. It
deserves to be dismissed and is hereby
dismissed. On the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, however, there shall
be no order as to costs.

……………………………J. 6
(C.K. THAKKER)

NEW DELHI, …………………………….J.July 11 , 2008. (D.K. JAIN)

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3 Responses to “SHIVANAND GAURISHANKAR BASWANTI Vs. LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS & ORS.”

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SHIVANAND GAURISHANKAR BASWANTI Vs. LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS & ORS.

3 Responses to “SHIVANAND GAURISHANKAR BASWANTI Vs. LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS & ORS.”

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